Accounts of the Mind

Accounts of the Mind

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Accounts of the Mind

In overview, conjectures regarding the mind have become rather acquisitive in this contemporary age. Even though there is a basis for this, consciousness has resulted into a subject that materialists are incapable of solving. Undeniably, the respective entity comprises the capability of undergoing real experiences in relation to the events taking place within the surroundings. Accordingly, several premises attempt to justify consciousness in a myriad of ways. As such, through exploring such theories, it may become easier to comprehend the manner in which consciousness among human beings functions with respect to the mind. In this case, the focus will specifically be based on representationalism as an imperative account of mind due to the influences it imposes on the generation of the conscious part of human beings. In spite of this, it is impossible to negate the notions posited by the theories of interpretationalism and eliminativism concerning the functionality of the mind.

Representationalism, as a conjecture, views symbols as illustrations of thoughts. In this case, these symbols function as objects that the mind utilizes in order to manipulate comprehensive and understandable information (Heil, 2013). For instance, the thought of food consumption would undergo illustration via a symbol, which is run via a program, and established as an output; a message telling the individual to obtain food. In this sense, representationalism alleges that the mind utilizes symbols in order to enable processes. Undeniably, several contentions have been established against this body of theory due to the allegations it asserts. Foremost, it is impossible to establish the consciousness of an individual as a representation. This is because the respective element may be a misconceived comprehension of the human mind. As such, consciousness may not even be existent since it is just an imagined mental state. Nonetheless, the manner in which persons are capable of establishing different mental states due to the existence of disparate representative symbols is a valid premise.

The allegation establishing the consciousness as a possible false and non-existent state is an idea of eliminativism. As part of the materialism premise, eliminativism comprises the drastic contention that the normal, common-sense comprehension of a person does not exist in real sense (Heil, 2013). Hence, in opposition to representationalism, consciousness may be a non-existent mental state implemented by the common sense. However, similar to materialistic conjectures, eliminativism seems to avoid its ability to elucidate the manner in which consciousness is formed and takes place. By rejecting the existence of such a mental state, eliminativism fails to explain the natural condition of the mind; the consciousness. Therefore, it adheres to the materialistic nature of mantle states that are non-existent. Hence, in this respect, the eliminativism account only rejects the subsistence of consciousness and its role in influencing participation among human beings. In this case, certain aspects of the human mind such as consciousness may not be existent as far as eliminativism is concerned.

Different from representationalism, interpretationalism borders on the seemingly postulated correlation between the mental states and an individual’s behavior. Accordingly, for the theory, mental states arise as an outcome of the mind’s interpretation of a particular behavior. As such, interpretationalism falls short of the valid claims that representationalism acknowledges. Indeed, interpretationalism dwells on the ascription that the mind draws as an outcome of a person’s behavior. In this case, consciousness, as a mental state, is a result of a person’s attitudes and mannerisms, which may be different or similar to another individual. Irrespective of this, interpretationalism comes short especially in the explanation of the occurrence of mental states among different people. Indeed, if a person is capable of interpreting his or her behavior and thereby establishing a mental state, why is he or she unable of interpreting the behavior of another individual? (Heil, 2013)

In addition to this loophole, interpretationalism is perceived as an example of a consistent regress based on the properties it embodies as a theory. As asserted, the respective conjecture establishes a person’s behavior as imperative in defining the mental state of a person. However, this facet of interpretationalism proves to be its downside. Consequently, the possession of connotations and attitudes by a person need to undergo interpretation by another. Nonetheless, this process is consistent since the behavior and meanings of the individual still need to undergo interpretation by the attitudes and mannerisms of a third party (Heil, 2013). In essence, interpretationalism is a procedure that digresses towards invalidity and insufficient clarity especially in defining consciousness as a mental state.

In conclusion, representationalism differs from the mentioned conjectures due to its focus on the significance and influence of symbols especially on consciousness. Undeniably, the respective premise presumes that each conscious state comprises a representation of a particular object within this material world. This line of thought is considerably fine especially in situations where objects actually originate in this type of setting. In spite of this, representationalism seems to lack a proper explanation of certain circumstances that the human mind experiences on a more rational basis. Nonetheless, the theory falls short in an attempt to explain the representations behind intangible aspects of the human mind such as hallucinations and dreams. Even though adherents to the premise may also establish dreams and phantasms as representations, representationalism, as a conjecture, fails to correlate these facets with consciousness.  

Reference:

Heil, J. (2013). Philosophy of mind: A contemporary introduction. New York, NY: Routledge.